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Introduction 
Many Americans have had interactions with police officers and other 
law-enforcement agents, and the majority of these police-citizen encounters 
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occur in the context of traffic stops.1  Although mildly inconvenient, traffic 
stops are necessary not only for enforcing traffic rules and deterring traffic 
violations, but they are generally beneficial for broader public safety 
concerns.  For many people, traffic stops are simply part of life.  For many 
racial minorities, however, especially African-American and Latino men, 
even a routine traffic stop takes on an entirely different meaning.2  
Historically, the relationship between racial minorities and police has been 
strained, and many members of racial minority groups believe that law- 
enforcement officers unfairly target them because of their race or ethnicity.3  
It is widely known that many Americans, especially minorities, believe that 
police officers use race as a “proxy” for criminal involvement.  
There is strong evidence that racial minorities believe law enforcement 
officers engage in racial profiling.  African-Americans have long argued 
that police officers scrutinize their behavior more closely, and many report 
that they are fearful of arrest even if they have done nothing illegal.4  The 
majority of African-Americans believe that racial profiling is wrong, yet is 
pervasive within their communities.5  The September 11th tragedy and 
increased attention surrounding immigration from Mexico, however, have 
caused other minority groups such as Arab-Americans and Latinos to 
become increasingly concerned that law-enforcement officers also unfairly 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Richard R. Johnson, Citizen Expectations of Police Traffic Stop Behavior, 27 
POLICING 487, 489 (2004) (“Traffic stops made up 52 percent of all police-citizen contacts in 
the USA in 1999.” (citing P.A. Lanagan et al., Contacts Between Police and the Public:  
Findings from 1999 National Survey, Bureau of Justice Statistics (2001))). 
 2. See Richard A. Fausset & P.J. Huffstutter, Black Males’ Fear of Racial Profiling 
Very Real, Regardless of Class, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2009, at A16, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/25/nation/na-racial-profiling25 (reporting that many 
members of racial minorities, particularly African-American males report the fear of racial 
profiling, and this fear transcends age, class, and wealth) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 3. See Richard Delgado, Law Enforcement in Subordinated Communities:  
Innovation and Response, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1193, 1199 (2008) (reviewing RONALD 
WEITZER & STEVEN TUCH, RACE AND POLICING IN AMERICA:  CONFLICT AND REFORM (2006)) 
(“Over time, whites and blacks come to view police and policing ‘in strikingly different 
terms.’”).  “Blacks especially are more likely than others to believe that the police are 
unaccountable, abusing citizens and treating minorities harshly.”  Id. 
 4. See KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME 26–27, 34 (1998); William J. 
Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1797 (1998) (offering empirical 
research supporting this proposition). 
 5. See RONALD WEITZER & STEVEN TUCH, RACE AND POLICING IN AMERICA 83 (2006) 
(noting that the “overwhelming majority of Blacks (92 percent) and Hispanics (83 percent) 
believe that profiling is widespread in the United States”). 
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target them based on their race or ethnicity.6  Stories of the humiliation and 
helplessness of families stranded in the rain with their belongings strewn 
alongside the highway are commonplace for many members of society.7  
Undoubtedly, the pernicious practice of racial profiling, or at least the 
perception that this practice occurs, has caused many citizens to alter their 
routine to avoid the indignity of yet another police stop.  Unfortunately, 
there is a growing body of evidence that suggests that the perception that 
police unjustly target minorities is not merely an unsubstantiated feeling, 
but an uncomfortable reality. 
While all forms of police misconduct or corruption are disturbing, 
racial profiling occupies a unique place among such harmful practices 
because it presents several unique issues that make it difficult to address 
through standard police accountability measures.  Society entrusts law-
enforcement officers with a wide-breadth of discretion in order to perform 
their everyday duties.8  While the fast-paced nature of law enforcement 
necessitates discretion, if left unchecked, broad grants of discretion can lead 
police officers to abuse their position and engage in misconduct ranging 
from falsifying evidence, participating in violent excessive uses of force, 
and engaging in racial profiling.  Many forms of police misconduct and 
corruption leave tangible evidence that allows law-enforcement agencies to 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See generally, Katherine Culliton, How Racial Profiling and Other Unnecessary 
Post-9/11 Anti-Immigrant Measures Have Exacerbated Long-Standing Discrimination 
Against Latino Citizens and Immigrants, 8 UDC L. REV. 141, 147 (2004) (“The anti-
immigrant backlash since 9/11 has severely and negatively affected Latino communities in 
ways that Congress and the Administration must recognize and correct.”). 
 7. See, e.g., David A. Harris, Driving While Black:  Racial Profiling on Our Nation’s 
Highways, ACLU (June 7, 1999) [hereinafter Harris, Driving While Black], 
http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/driving-while-black-racial-profiling-our-nations-highways 
(last visited November 29, 2011) (providing various anecdotes of minorities stopped by the 
police and how their treatment during the stop impacted their lives) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); David A. Harris, The 
Stories, the Statistics, and the Law:  Why ‘Driving While Black’ Matters, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 
265, 265-75 (1999) [hereinafter Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law] 
(summarizing the police stop of Gerald Rossano and his 12 year-old young son Gregory, 
which lasted 2 and a half hours, and during which officers terrorized the young boy with a 
police dog). 
 8. The dissenters in Terry v. Ohio and its progeny warned that police misconduct can 
almost always be characterized as allowing police discretion in performing their duties. 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968).  In his dissent, Justice Douglas explained, “To give the 
police greater power than a magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian path.”  Id. 
at 38.  He further noted:  “Yet if the individual is no longer to be sovereign, if the police can 
pick him up whenever they do not like the cut of his jib, if they can ‘seize’ and ‘search’ him 
in their discretion, we enter a new regime.”  Id. at 39. 
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implement remedial measures to alleviate the problem.9  Racial profiling, 
however, is an elusive practice that can easily remain shrouded from view. 
Racial profiling remains one of the most problematic issues within the 
criminal justice system for several reasons.10  First, claims of racial 
profiling are extremely difficult to substantiate using traditional measures.  
The Supreme Court, in Whren v. United States,11 granted officers carte 
blanche authority to conduct pretextual stops, which are completely legal 
under the Fourth Amendment.12  As long as an officer has probable cause to 
stop someone for one violation, the officer may use that violation as the 
basis for a stop even when though the officer may have only a “hunch” that 
the person is involved in other criminal activity.13  Thus, observing a car 
with a broken tail light would permit officers to stop a car when the true 
underlying motivation was the officer’s unsubstantiated belief that the 
                                                                                                                 
 9. A classic example of police misconduct that leaves tangible evidence is excessive 
use of force. The injuries left by an officer who uses excessive force can be seen and 
recorded.  In response to this type of police misconduct, many police departments use police 
psychologists who conduct pre-employment screening, on the job training, and see 
individual officers to help them develop the proper coping and stress management 
techniques.  See Ellen M. Scrivner, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, CONTROLLING POLICE USE OF 
EXCESSIVE FORCE:  THE ROLE OF THE POLICE PSYCHOLOGIST, *10-20 (1994);  see also Ronald 
Weitzer, Can the Police be Reformed?, CONTEXTS, Summer 2005, at 21, 25 available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~soc/docs/Weitzer/Can_the.pdf (citing some of the ways in which 
forms of police misconduct or corruption could leave tangible evidence that allows for 
police departments to implement remedial measures to alleviate the problem) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).  Some of those methods 
include recording of characteristics like race, gender, and age of all motorists during stops on 
prepared forms or computer systems, mounting video cameras on the dashboards of patrol 
cars to record encounters, implementing “early warning systems” using computerized 
records of an officer’s complaints, civil suits, use of force and firearms, and other indicators 
of questionable performance.  Id. 
 10. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RACIAL PROFILING FACT SHEET 1 (2003) available at 
http://www. justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/June/racial_profiling_fact_sheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 
8, 2011) (defining racial profiling as law enforcement conduct that “rests on the erroneous 
assumption that any particular individual of one race or ethnicity is more likely to engage in 
misconduct than any particular individual of other races or ethnicities”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 11. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996) (concluding that a stop was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the officers had probable cause to believe 
that petitioners had violated the traffic code). 
 12. See id. at 812–13 (reviewing precedent where the Court refused to invalidate 
arrests based on pretext and observing, “Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, 
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”). 
 13. See id. at 813 (“We think these cases foreclose any argument that the 
constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the 
individual officers involved.”). 
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vehicle contained drugs.14  Policies such as this do not discourage or 
prevent a racially–biased officer from conducting a stop.  Furthermore, 
even when officers lack probable cause, the Fourth Amendment allows 
police officers to conduct investigatory stops to determine whether or not 
criminal activity is afoot as long as there is reasonable suspicion (a lesser 
standard than probable cause) for the stop.15  Unfortunately, these highly 
discretionary stops permit racial bias, either explicit or implicit, to go 
unchecked and unpunished.  The Court in Whren noted that any claims of 
discrimination could be litigated under the Equal Protection clause.16  While 
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, in 
order to succeed on an Equal Protection claim, claimants have to show 
intentional discrimination and, as is discussed infra, substantiating these 
claims is extremely difficult (especially in light of Whren and its allowance 
of race-neutral reasons to stop suspects).17 
Second, racial profiling presents special problems because whether or 
not authorities can “prove” racial profiling claims by traditional legal 
measures, it is indisputable that many minorities rationally perceive that 
they are treated unfairly.18  Whether racial profiling is real or perceived, 
failing to implement measures to reduce or prevent the practice damages 
the credibility of the law-enforcement agency.  The perception of injustice 
undermines the values of our criminal justice system.19  Ultimately, the 
diminished faith in law enforcement can detrimentally impact the affected 
community.  Given the difficulties of proving racial profiling and the 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See id. at 818 (“[A] traffic stop . . . is governed by the usual rule that probable 
cause to believe the law has been broken ‘outbalances’ private interest in avoiding police 
contact.”).  “For the run-of-the-mine case, . . . probable cause justifies a search and seizure.”  
Id. at 819. 
 15. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (holding that a police officer is entitled to 
conduct limited searches of citizens when the officer believes criminal activity is afoot and 
the citizen might be “armed and presently dangerous”). 
 16. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“But the constitutional 
basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection 
Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 17. See infra Part I.B. 
 18. See WEITZER & TUCH, supra note 5, at 83 (showing overwhelming majorities of 
Blacks and Hispanics perceive widespread racial profiling). 
 19. See David A. Harris, Using Race or Ethnicity As a Factor in Assessing the 
Reasonableness of Fourth Amendment Activity:  Description, Yes; Prediction, No. 73 MISS. 
L.J. 423, 449-50 (2003) [hereinafter Harris, Using Race and Ethnicity As a Factor] (stating 
that some law enforcement officers use a person’s skin color or ethnic features to make a 
prediction about criminal activity); see generally, L. Darnell Weeden, Racial Profiling and 
the Implications of Jena Six in Undermining the Civil Rights of Blacks In America, 36 S.U. 
L. REV. 239, 240-44 (2009) (describing the use of racial profiling by police). 
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inevitable harms that even the rational perception of profiling can have on a 
community, finding suitable remedies is imperative. 
Police agencies are generally insular entities that cultivate a culture 
that can be resistant to accountability.20  Increasing transparency and 
allowing the community access to information may alleviate many of the 
tensions between police officers and members of these communities.  This 
Article argues that rather than relying on adjudicatory remedies, local law-
enforcement agencies should implement proactive measures to increase 
transparency with respect to internal police practices.  Part I explores the 
difficulty of proving racial profiling claims.  Part II explores the harms of 
racial profiling and argues that policymakers should shift their attention 
from arguments regarding “proof” that the practice of racial profiling 
persists and should instead focus on repairing the distrust that the 
perception of racial profiling and similar injustices within the criminal 
justice cause. 
Remedying an elusive practice such as racial profiling remains a 
challenging issue for the judiciary and reformers must rely on other avenues 
for a solution.  For example, even where evidence demonstrates that 
minorities are disproportionately stopped and searched, courts rarely 
recognize the victim’s claim or provide relief.21  Thus, it is clear that courts 
will not be the catalysts of change.  This Article argues that while courts 
may be reluctant to provide judicial remedies, police departments 
themselves should not ignore the perceptions and should take measures to 
reduce any possible profiling and increase partnerships with communities.  
An indication that a police department may be engaging in racial profiling 
has a detrimental and far-reaching impact not only on the individuals who 
experience it first-hand, but also on other members of the targeted 
community.  Ultimately, this pernicious practice threatens to undermine 
legitimacy in law enforcement and the criminal justice system for large 
segments of society, which impacts society as a whole.  Part III concludes 
by suggesting proactive remedies institutions and policymakers should 
consider to alleviate the tensions between communities and police officers 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 453, 455 (2004) (stating that “an overly aggressive police culture that 
facilitates and rewards violent conduct” is the biggest hurdle to achieving lasting police 
reform). 
 21. See David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity:  Racial 
Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 349–59 (2011) 
(concluding that a large number of civil suits are not successful because of the barriers 
presented by the current judicial remedies). 
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with respect to racial profiling.  Data collection efforts are imperative to 
educating the public and police agencies about racial profiling, but these 
efforts fall short as a long-term remedy.  Therefore, in addition to data 
collection during traffic stops, this Article proposes several policy solutions 
that the federal government and state legislatures should implement to 
address racial profiling within local law enforcement agencies. 
I.  Racial Profiling:  The Problem of Proof 
Recent examples demonstrate that police misconduct continues to 
persist and is a systemic problem in many of our nation’s local police 
departments.  In 2011, a federal judge sentenced former Chicago police 
commander Jon Burge to four-and-a-half years in jail after he was 
convicted of lying to officials about widespread police misconduct by 
police officers in the area under his command.22  Months later, in August 
2011, a federal jury convicted several New Orleans police officers accused 
of shooting unarmed citizens on Danziger Bridge in the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina.23  Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Danziger Bridge case was 
the widespread evidence of internal corruption that followed—several 
supervising officers who arrived to investigate the shooting instead assisted 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Annie Sweeney, Burge Given 4 ½ Years in Prison, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 21, 
2011, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/ct-met-burge-sentencing-0122-20110121, 
0,6520153.story (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 23. Richard Fausset, Five Police Convicted in Post-Katrina Shootings, L.A. TIMES, 
Aug. 6, 2011, at A7 (reporting that Sergeants Kenneth Bowen, Robert Gisevius, Archie 
Kaufman and Officers Anthony Villavaso and Robert Faulcon were found guilty).  Five 
other officers of the New Orleans Police department pled guilty to numerous charges linked 
to the cover-up:  Lieutenant Michael Lohman, Detective Jeffry Lehrman, and Officers 
Michael Hunter, Robert Barrios, and Ignatius Hill.  Sergeant Gerard Dugue faces trial in 
September for his role.  Id.  For a detailed account of all of the charges and the officer’s 
roles in the cover-up, see Ex-Cop Pleads Guilty in Katrina Bridge Shooting Cover-Up, 
CNN.COM, Feb. 24, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-02-24/justice/katrina.cop.charges_1_ 
danziger-bridge-police-officers-new-orleans-police?_s=PM:CRIME (last visited Nov. 8, 
2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); Ex-
Police Officer Admits Role in Cover-Up of Louisiana Bridge Shooting, CNN.COM, Mar. 11, 
2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-03-11/justice/nopd.shooting_1_danziger-bridge-new-
orleans-police-ex-police?_s=PM:CRIME (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); Third Officer Pleads Guilty 
in Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/us/08shooting.html 
(last visited November 8, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
and Social Justice). 
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in an elaborate plan to conceal the actions of the other officers.24  In 
addition to the physical brutality these widely publicized incidents 
characterize, police misconduct also includes falsification of records or 
evidence, and providing false testimony in court.  Racial profiling, which 
the U.S. Department of Justice defines as a decision by law enforcement 
that “rests on the erroneous assumption that any particular individual of one 
race or ethnicity is more likely to engage in misconduct than any particular 
individual of other races or ethnicities,” is another common practice that 
plagues many police departments.25 
Unlike the forms of police misconduct mentioned above, claims of 
racial profiling can be difficult to substantiate.  Thus, the difficulty in 
detecting racial profiling and determining the extent of the practice by law-
enforcement agencies nationwide presents a difficult task.  There are few 
instances where a police department will readily reveal an explicit policy 
that encourages officers to stop individuals based on race.  Similarly, it is 
rare that an individual police officer will admit that the true motivation of a 
traffic stop or other investigative police practice was because of the race of 
the suspect.  In contrast to instances of racial profiling, witnesses may 
capture physical police brutality on videotape and medical professionals 
can document and testify about a victim’s bruises.  Occasionally, police 
officers may reveal other instances of misconduct or corruption within the 
police department.  When tangible evidence or eyewitness reports exist, 
authorities can more easily address claims of brutality and corruption.  In 
contrast to these instances, racial profiling remains elusive and is therefore 
difficult to remedy. 
A.  Proving Racial Profiling:  Dueling Statistics 
Although the courts and the United States government have declared 
that racial profiling is an illegal practice, there is a dangerous perception 
among members of minority groups (particularly African-Americans and 
Latinos) that law-enforcement officers unfairly target them because of their 
race or ethnicity.26  The Supreme Court has clearly established that using 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See Ex-Police Officer Admits Role in Cover-Up of Louisiana Bridge Shooting, 
supra note 23, at 2 (“Lehrmann also admitted he helped compile a false report on the 
incidents, and was with others when they planted a gun as part of the cover-up, according to 
court documents.”). 
 25. U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 1. 
 26. See WEITZER & TUCH, supra note 5 (documenting pervasive perception among 
African-Americans and Latinos that police target citizens based on race and ethnicity). 
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race, ethnicity, or national origin as a proxy for criminal suspicion violates 
the constitutional requirement that police and other government officials 
accord to all citizens the equal protection of the law.27  Similarly, many 
government officials have disavowed the use of racial profiling.  For 
example, former Attorney General John Ashcroft declared that “racial 
profiling is an unconstitutional deprivation of equal protection under our 
constitution”28 and Norman Mineta, former U.S. Secretary of 
Transportation, publicly decried the temptation for authorities to engage in 
racial profiling.29 
Despite these admonitions and decries against racial profiling, there is 
a widespread perception among many citizens that racial profiling is still a 
pervasive problem.  Unfortunately, there is a growing body of statistical 
evidence demonstrating that this “perception” of unfair treatment is an 
uncomfortable reality.  Studies from various states and localities 
demonstrate that police are more likely to stop African-Americans and 
Latinos and are more likely to ask members of these groups for consent to 
search their person or vehicle.  In the late 1990s, a startling report regarding 
the Maryland State Police showed that even though African-Americans 
comprised only 17.5% of the drivers violating traffic laws on the road, 
72.9% of all of the drivers who were stopped and searched along a portion 
of Interstate 95 were African-American.30  Similarly, the New Jersey State 
Police reported that 73.2% of those stopped and arrested were Black, while 
only 13.5% of the cars on the road had a Black driver or passenger.31  Data 
from Missouri showed that for 2000 and 2001, African-Americans were 
approximately one-third more likely to be stopped as compared to the rest 
of the population.32  In 2008, Yale Law Professor Ian Ayres prepared a 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 
(1977) (stating that proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause); see also Thomas B. Edsall, Black Caucus, 
Ashcroft Have Tense Meeting:  Attorney General Cites “Candid Exchange” and Stresses 
Agreement on Profiling, WASH. POST, March 1, 2001, at A6 (describing a meeting between 
Attorney General John D. Ashcroft and members of the Congressional Black Caucus). 
 28. Lizette Alvarez, Ashcroft Meets With Black Lawmakers Who Opposed His 
Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, March 1, 2001, at A21. 
 29. See David A. Harris, New Approaches to Ensuring the Legitimacy of Police 
Conduct:  Racial Profiling Redux, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 73, 73 (2003) [hereinafter 
Harris, New Approaches] (“Even as U.S. Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta says, 
repeatedly and publicly, that there will be no racial or ethnic profiling in airport security, 
those who run security operations have other ideas.”). 
 30. I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 850 (2008). 
 31. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law, supra note 7, at 279. 
 32. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Missouri, The “War on Terrorism,” and Immigrants:  
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report that also yielded staggering statistics.33  Ayres found that “[f]or every 
10,000 [California] residents, 4,569 Blacks were stopped.34  For Whites, 
only 1,750 were stopped.35  For Latinas/os, 1,773 were stopped.”36  The 
same study found that Blacks who were stopped were 127% more likely 
than stopped Whites to be frisked—and stopped Latinos were 43% more 
likely than Whites to be frisked.37  In New York City, initiatives 
implemented in the early 1990s, known as “quality of life” policing, 
contributed to a disproportionate number of police stops and frisks of racial 
minorities.38  Recent data demonstrate that this practice remains prevalent 
within New York City where police continue to stop and frisk Blacks and 
Hispanics in numbers disproportionate to their representation in the general 
population.  For example, in 2006, of 508,540 reported stops by New York 
City police officers, 55% involved Blacks, 30% involved Hispanics, and 
only 11% involved Whites.39 
In the past, policymakers focused on the dearth of statistical 
information related to racial profiling.40  With many states currently 
gathering the data either voluntarily or because of statutory mandates, the 
                                                                                                                 
Legal Challenges Post 9/11, 67 MO. L. REV. 775, 813 (2002). 
 33. See Ian Ayres & Jonathan Borowsky, A Study of Racially Disparate Outcomes in 
the Los Angeles Police Department, ACLU OF S. CAL. 31 (2008), http://www.aclu-
sc.org/documents/view/47 (last visited Nov. 8, 2011) (providing a table of statistics for the 
number of stops per 10,000 residents in 942 reporting districts in Los Angeles) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Reneeh Kim, Legitimizing Community Consent to Local Policies:  The Need 
for Democratically Negotiated Community Representation on Civilian Advisory Councils, 36 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 461, 464 n.12  (2001) (“The New York State Attorney General’s 
office investigation showed that blacks were six times more likely than whites to be stopped 
on the street by police, and that Hispanics were over four times more likely to be stopped 
than whites, during a fourteen-month period in 1998-1999.”). 
 39. Christopher Dunn, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties:  NYPD Stops and Frisks and 
the Fourth Amendment, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 27, 2007, at 3.  See Tim Roche & Constance 
Humburg, Stops Far Too Routine for Many Blacks, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 19, 1997, at 
1A (providing other statistics involving disproportionate stops and frisks). 
 40. For example, Representative John Conyers (MI) proposed the Traffics Stops 
Statistics Act of 1997, a federal statute that would have mandated police organizations to 
collect data during every police stop, including race and whether a search was performed.  
Although the legislation did not pass, it eventually prompted states to enact variations of 
Conyers’s bill.  See Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law, supra note 7 at 320–23. 
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predominant issues now focus on debates about the methodology of the 
data collection and what the data analysis actually shows.41 
To determine whether or not an entity is engaging in racial profiling, 
some researchers have compared the number of minority motorists stopped 
by police with the number of minorities living in a given area.42  These 
studies use census data to create a baseline for comparison against the data 
related to traffic stops.43  If the percentage of minority drivers stopped is 
greater than that percentage of members of that group living in the area, 
some researchers view this as a strong indicator of racial profiling.44   
Similarly, if the percentage of minorities stopped is lower than the 
percentage of minorities in a particular area, police departments may view 
this as proof that no racial profiling has occurred.  Many critics of this 
approach argue that the census data, which is collected only every ten years, 
is outdated and does not reflect the actual percentage of minorities using the 
road.45  Nor does the census data indicate whether residents or non-
residents are actually driving in an area.  Critics of using census data have 
argued that results may be skewed because even though someone resides in 
an area, the data does not consider whether they are the legal driving age or 
too old or infirm to drive.46 
Skeptics offer several responses to the claims that the statistical 
evidence proves that police disproportionately stop minorities.  First, some 
allege that the propensity for minorities to commit criminal acts accounts 
for the disproportionate number of police stops.47  However, experts have 
widely discredited this proposition, and studies show that even when 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See id. at 277–88 (comparing and contrasting methods of data collections in Ohio, 
New Jersey, and Maryland). 
 42. See Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law, supra note 7 at 277–88 
(collecting studies from different jurisdictions). 
 43. See id. at 284–85 (examining how census data is gathered and used to create a 
baseline). 
 44. See id. at 279 (“Absent some other explanation for the dramatically 
disproportionate number of stops of blacks, it would appear that the race of the occupants 
and/or drivers of the cars is a decisive factor or a factor with great explanatory power.”). 
 45. LORIE A. FRIDELL, BY THE NUMBERS:  A GUIDE FOR ANALYZING RACE DATA FROM 
VEHICLE STOPS 10 (2004). 
 46. Id. at viii. 
 47. See Heather MacDonald, Fighting Crime Where the Criminals Are, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 26, 2010, at A19 (arguing that “[s]uch stops happen more frequently in minority 
neighborhoods because that is where the vast majority of violent crime occurs”); see also 
Mathias Risse & Richard Zeckhauser, Racial Profiling, 32 PHIL. & PUBLIC AFFAIRS, no. 2, 
2004, at 131, 132 n.2 (citing empirical studies that purport to show a correlation between 
membership in certain racial groups and the tendency to commit crimes). 
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stopped at higher rates than non-minorities, minorities are less likely to 
have contraband in the form of weapons or drugs.48  For example, one study 
reported that in Highway Patrol searches of vehicles driven by non-
minorities, successful “hits” for contraband occurred in 33.0% of the 
searches, while only 26.3% of the searches of cars driven by African-
Americans revealed contraband.49  Similarly, statistics from California 
show that although Blacks who had been stopped were 127% more likely to 
be frisked than stopped Whites, Blacks were 25% less likely to be found 
with drugs and 33% less likely to have other contraband.50 The same study 
found that even though police disproportionately stopped Latinos, they too, 
were less likely to have contraband than their White counterparts.51  While 
some experts have found the hit rate numbers to indicate a disparity 
between minorities and Whites, others researchers have found the hit rate to 
be consistent, with the same percentage of stopped drivers across racial 
groups yielding hits for contraband.52 
There are several critiques regarding the analysis of existing racial-
profiling data including a report issued by the Government Accounting 
Office (“GAO”).  In a 2000 report, the GAO noted that much of the data 
analysis related to racial profiling “did not fully examine whether different 
groups may have been at different levels of risk for being stopped because 
they differed in their rates and/or severity of committing traffic 
violations.”53  The GAO also stated that of the quantitative studies it 
reviewed, there was a dearth of information concerning the level of 
seriousness regarding the traffic violations that provided the officer with the 
requisite level of suspicion or cause to stop the vehicle.54  Similarly, the 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See, e.g., Richard L. Lundman, Driver Race, Ethnicity, and Gender and Citizen 
Reports of Vehicle Searches by Police and Vehicle Search Hits:  Toward a Triangulated 
Scholarly Understanding, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 309, 315 (2004) (discussing an 
analysis of data collected by sixty-five Minnesota police departments). 
 49. Id. 
 50. M.K.B. Darmer, Teaching Whren to White Kids, 15 MICH J. RACE & L. 109, 119 
(2009). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Chet K.W. Prager, Lies, Damned Lies, Statistics and Racial Profiling, 13 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 515, 521 (2004) (noting that “studies in several states have revealed a 
remarkable consistency:  whether white or black . . . approximately 30% of police highway 
searches yield contraband”). 
 53. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/GGD-00-41, RACIAL PROFILING:  
LIMITED DATA AVAILABLE ON MOTORIST STOPS 1 (2000), http://www.gao.gov/new. 
items/gg00041.pdf. 
 54. See id. at 8–11 (reviewing studies analyzing (1) motorists traveling on the New 
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GAO reported that “missing” data from the comparison groups may have 
skewed results.55 
Despite these critiques, information collection on traffic stops can be 
integral to creating much-needed transparency in law enforcement.  
Furthermore, commentators recently have argued that there have been 
marked improvements in the data collection and analysis related to racial 
profiling, and that researchers have remedied many of the limitations of 
previous studies.56  Continually improving upon the data collection methods 
and analysis will help policymakers determine what, if any, measures are 
necessary to combat racial profiling. 
B.  The Difficulty Sustaining Racial Profiling Claims Based on Equal 
Protection 
Compared to other forms of police misconduct, racial profiling is 
difficult to prove under current standards.  The difficulty in substantiating 
the existence of racial profiling, and the emphasis policy makers have 
placed on proving its existence, has made it difficult to implement remedial 
measures.  Unlike physical police brutality which can be proved though 
tangible evidence (photos, medical reports, or eyewitness testimony) or 
other instances of corruption, racial profiling is far more difficult to 
substantiate, and may be nearly impossible to prove in a court of law.  In 
the case of Wilkins v. Maryland State Police,57 one of the most famous 
successful racial profiling suits, a rare “smoking gun,” tangible evidentiary 
proof of a policy of racial profiling, likely prompted settlement.58  In this 
case, Maryland State Police files actually revealed a written memorandum 
                                                                                                                 
Jersey Turnpike—one by researcher J.L. Lamberth and another by the New Jersey State 
Police; (2) a study along Interstate 95 in Maryland; (3) stops of motorists in Florida; and (4) 
an ACLU report on motorists in Philadelphia). 
 55. See id. at 11 (discussing the significance of the limitations of the available 
analyses). 
 56. See Melisa Whitney, Note, The Statistical Evidence of Racial Profiling in Traffic 
Stops and Searches:  Rethinking the Use of Statistics to Prove Discriminatory Intent, 49 
B.C. L. REV. 263, 287–88 (2008) (discussing the increased quality of data collection related 
to racial profiling). 
 57. For a more complete discussion of Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, see David A. 
Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses:  The Supreme Court and 
Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 554, 563-66 (1977). 
 58. See Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law, supra note 7 at 280 (describing 
the Maryland State Police settlement with Robert Wilkins after discovery revealed an 
internal police memo instructing troopers to target “black males and black females”). 
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that set forth a criminal profile explicitly based on race.59  Despite the 
statistics showing the disproportionate stops and searches of minorities, in 
most instances, victims of racial profiling will not be able to produce these 
“smoking” memoranda.  Ironically, without this crucial evidence of 
purposeful discrimination, courts will likely bar equal protection claims 
because plaintiffs have failed to show that the police officers intentionally 
discriminated against them.60 
Several courts have refused to grant relief despite evidence of 
disproportionate traffic stops of minorities.  For example, in United States 
v. Avery,61 the Sixth Circuit held that the defendant’s equal protection claim 
could not be sustained, and rejected statistics showing that police 
disproportionately targeted African-Americans because the officers had a 
plausible, non-racial reason for detaining the defendant.62  Similarly, in 
Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach,63 the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary 
judgment because appellant failed to provide evidence to refute the officer’s 
race neutral explanation for the traffic stop.64 The Eighth Circuit reached a 
similar result in Johnson v. Crooks,65 where the court denied relief because 
the plaintiff could not provide affirmative evidence of the discriminatory 
reason for a traffic stop.66  Given the constitutional framework of Equal 
Protection claims and these perverse results, David Harris has noted that 
racial profiling is “one of those abhorrent creatures that the law 
prohibits . . . a practice, that if proven, will bring the legal equivalent of 
lightning bolts hurled by Zeus down on the perpetrators.”67  Unsurprisingly, 
                                                                                                                 
 59. See id. n.85 (citing Armed Drug Traffickers in Allegany County, Maryland:  Police 
Officer Safety, CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT (Md. State Police, Apr. 27, 1992)). 
 60. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 
(1977) (stating that proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause). 
 61. United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 62.  See id. at 353 (rejecting the defendant’s equal protection claim because the officers 
had a reasonable explanation for the stop). 
 63. Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach, 329 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 64. See id. at 731–32 (affirming summary judgment because appellant failed to 
provide sufficient evidence to counter the officer’s testimony that the traffic stop was not 
motivated by appellant’s race); see also Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 999–1000 (8th 
Cir. 2003) (denying relief because plaintiff failed to provide evidence of discrimination to 
counter the officer’s race-neutral justification of the traffic stop). 
 65. Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 66. Id. at 999–1000 (denying the plaintiff’s claim that she was stopped due to racial 
profiling because she did not have affirmative evidence). 
 67. Harris, New Approaches, supra note 29, at 75. 
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there is widespread consensus that courts have been “largely ineffective in 
the battle against profiling.”68 
Furthermore, racial profiling remains elusive and difficult to remediate 
because, even in the absence of intentional forms of discrimination, 
individual officers may be motivated by their unconscious racial biases.  
Despite much progress on racial issues, racial discrimination is not a “relic 
of the past” but instead remains a contemporary feature of modern 
society.69  Today, overt displays of discrimination are rare, but racial 
prejudice “often goes unrecognized even by the individual who responds 
unconsciously to such motivation.”70  For example, several psychological 
studies testing implicit bias demonstrate that images of African-Americans 
evoke more fear than other groups and confirm that members of minority 
groups, particularly African-American males, are associated with 
aggressive behavior.71 
Whether or not there is definitive proof of discrimination, it is 
indisputable that many members of minority groups perceive that many 
police officers harbor and exercise racial animus when policing 
communities of color.72  This perception itself can be damaging to the 
credibility and legitimacy of a law-enforcement agency. 
II.  The Harms of Racial Profiling 
Even assuming statistical evidence of racial profiling is inconclusive 
and courts fail to find intentional discrimination, these facts have little 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Seth Kotch & Robert Mosteller, The Racial Justice Act and the Long Struggle 
With Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2031, 2102 (2010) 
(discussing the importance of unconscious racial motivation in death penalty sentencing). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See generally Catherine A. Cottrell & Steven L. Neuberg, Different Emotional 
Reactions to Different Groups:  A Sociofunctional Threat-Based Approach to Prejudice, 88 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 770 (2005) (discussing studies of the connection of racial 
images and bias). 
 72. See Wesley G. Skogan, Steven A. Tuch & Ronald Weitzer, Police-Community 
Relations in a Majority-Black City, 45 J. OF RES. IN CRIME & DELINQUENCY 398, 398–428 
(2008) available at http://www.gwu.edu/~soc/docs/Weitzer/Police_Community.pdf 
(describing perception of police misconduct); Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in 
the City:  Criminal Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1226 (2000) (noting that, “[w]hile needing protection from crime, 
many distrust the police and see their order-maintenance efforts as bullying and fear 
producing”). 
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practical impact for certain individuals or the police officers who work 
within those communities to keep residents safe.  With or without the 
imprimatur of a court decision, it is indisputable that many members of 
minority groups perceive an injustice, and this perception is dangerous and 
harmful to both the community and law enforcement.  Even the perception 
that certain groups are treated unfairly undermines the legitimacy of the law 
enforcement agency, and thus has a deleterious effect on crime control and 
prevention.73 
A.  Racial Profiling Imposes a Racial Tax on Impacted Individuals and 
Groups 
Racial profiling leads to the societal stigmatization of victims known 
as a “racial tax.”74  Both the individual and the targeted community as a 
whole suffer psychological and emotional harms of racial profiling.  Casual 
observers may view multiple police stops as a mere inconvenience, but in 
reality this “mere inconvenience” is really a harsh form of social 
stigmatization.  Those who become targets of racial profiling suffer the 
emotional and psychological burden of racial profiling, and some members 
of minority groups have reported psychological harms of humiliation and 
depression as a result of racial profiling.75 
The “broad taint of suspected criminality”76 that burdens the entire 
ethnic or racial group that has been profiled, has been referred to as a 
“racial tax.”77  Randall Kennedy, a professor at Harvard Law School, 
                                                                                                                 
 73. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler, & Aziz Z. Huq, American Policing at a 
Crossroads:  Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 335, 347 (“When perceptions of procedural justice and legitimacy decline, 
people’s willingness to obey also declines, but when authorities build their legitimacy, 
people are more willing to comply with the law.”). 
 74. Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
163, 213–14 (2002) (noting that Professor Randall Kennedy popularized the term “racial 
tax”). 
 75. Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 15–16 (2003) (discussing minority right to respect); AMNESTY INT’L, 
Threat and Humiliation:  Racial Profiling, Domestic Security, and Human Rights in the 
United States xiv (2004) [hereinafter Threat and Humiliation], available at 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/racial_profiling/report/rp_report.pdf (noting that African-
Americans have reported various emotional harms of racial profiling). 
 76. See Harris, Using Race and Ethnicity As a Factor, supra note 19, at 454. 
 77. See Alschuler, supra note 74, at 213–18 (explaining the definition of a “racial 
tax”). 
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widely publicized this term, which is used to describe the additional 
burdens placed upon African-American, Arabic, Latino and Asian 
minorities for their membership within their specific race/ethnic group.78  
The “tax” has a particularly acute impact upon those of Latino descent, 
since they are often forced to prove their citizenship in addition to suffering 
the injustice of racial profiling.79  Officers create an environment where 
Latinos are “cast as foreigners,” and those of the working class in emerging 
Latino communities are questioned more often since they might bear a 
resemblance to the “stereotypical image of what illegal immigrants 
supposedly look like.”80  Because a large majority of Latinos live in the 
United States are citizens or legal immigrants, this means that legal and 
lawful residents unjustly bear the burden of these “citizenship 
encounters.”81  Each of these forms of racial taxation unduly burdens the 
targeted group, for no other reason than a person’s membership to that 
group.82 
B.  Racial Profiling Detrimentally Impacts Minority Communities 
In addition to the unjust burdens racial profiling places on 
minorities, racial profiling implicates several broader societal 
problems.  First, pervasive racial profiling is one factor that may lead 
to higher incarceration rates among racial minorities.83  Despite 
significant progress in the sphere of race relations, members of racial 
minority groups are overrepresented in the criminal justice system.84  
                                                                                                                 
 78. See id. (“Randall Kennedy observes that a Latino stopped at an immigration 
checkpoint is made to pay a type of racial tax for the campaign against illegal immigration 
that whites, blacks, and Asians escape.”). 
 79. See Anthony E. Mucchetti, Driving While Brown:  A Proposal for Ending Racial 
Profiling in Emerging Latino Communities, 8 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 20 (2005) (noting 
that Latinos bear a double-burden by shouldering both a criminal and an illegal immigrant 
stigma). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. (discussing the burdens placed upon Latinos as a result of racial taxation). 
 83. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Case for African American and Latina/o Cooperation 
in Challenging Racial Profiling in Law Enforcement, 55 FLA. L. REV. 341, 344 (2003) 
(discussing how a higher percentage of traffic stops of minorities may be correlated to the 
higher percentage of minorities in prison). 
 84. See DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE:  WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT 
WORK 75–76 (2002) (noting that Blacks and Latinos are disproportionately arrested and 
incarcerated). 
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Targeting specific groups for stops, searches, and arrests is linked to 
increased incarceration rates of those belonging to the targeted 
groups.85  One example involves targeting African-Americans, 
specifically African-American males, in the investigation and 
prosecution of drug crimes.86  Even if the racial profiling of African-
American males for drug crimes leads to the arrest of guilty 
individuals, innocent members of these minority communities still 
suffer.87  The overrepresentation of racial minorities in the criminal 
justice system should prompt policymakers to carefully scrutinize the 
earliest interactions between police and racial minorities.  It is within 
these crucial early stages of investigation that racial profiling is likely 
to occur. 
High incarceration rates exacerbate the overall harm to the 
community because those who are incarcerated come from the “same 
racially isolated and socioeconomically disadvantaged 
neighborhoods.”88  By losing a number of the adults from an already 
disadvantaged area, the community and children suffer without adult 
members of their society.89  In addition, those that return to their 
community bring with them emotional and psychological effects from 
the brutality of prison life.90  The families of those sent to prison also 
                                                                                                                 
 85. See id. (noting the consequences of targeting a specific group for law enforcement 
purposes). 
 86. See R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling:  Race, Policing and the Drug War, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 571, 594–96 (2003) (examining instances of police profiling of African-
American males for such crimes).  Banks goes on to note: 
During the past quarter century, aggregate increases in incarceration, coupled 
with growing racial disparities, have resulted in staggering and unprecedented 
levels of incarceration for black men in particular.  A recent study by the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics found that in 2001 nearly seventeen percent of black men 
were currently or previously imprisoned. Black men are more than five times as 
likely as white men to enter prison . . . .  These disparities have grown 
dramatically in recent years. While a variety of factors account for these 
developments, the importance of the drug war is beyond dispute. 
Id. 
 87. See id. (“Such distributive injustice is reinforced to the extent that, as the 
following discussion suggests, the incarceration of the guilty also indirectly burdens the 
innocent.”). 
 88. Id. at 596; see also D. J. Silton, U.S. Prisons and Racial Profiling:  A Covertly 
Racist Nation Rides a Vicious Cycle, 20 LAW & INEQ. 53, 54 (2002) (describing the 
devastating cycle that racially disparate incarceration and sentencing creates). 
 89. See Banks, supra note 86, at 596 (“The families of inmates lose the social and 
economic support that the person might otherwise have provided.”). 
 90. See id. (stating that adults may have trouble with reentry into the community after 
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suffer, emotionally and economically.91  Many families often lose their 
primary breadwinner, and the organization of the familial structure can 
be destabilized.92  If pervasive and unjust racial profiling can be 
remediated, this may ease some of the economic, political, 
sociological, and familial harms felt across minority communities that 
suffer from higher incarceration rates.93 
C.  Racial Profiling Detrimentally Impacts Police-Citizen Partnerships 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the perception that certain 
groups are treated unfairly undermines the legitimacy of the law 
enforcement agency, and thus has a deleterious effect on crime control 
and prevention.94  Many members of minority communities are also 
disproportionately victims of crime and may live in areas that 
experience higher rates of crime.95  For example, in many large urban 
areas, a disproportionate number of crime victims are African-
American, and thus partnerships between citizens and police are 
essential to crime prevention.96  As one scholar noted, “[T]here is a 
causal link between the perception of the law and levels of compliance.  
Unfortunately, the perception in many poor and minority communities 
is that the law, as exemplified by the police, is illegitimate, a 
perception that encourages non-compliance.”97 
It follows that areas in need of the greatest amount of law 
enforcement protection are also likely to have a large proportion of 
residents who distrust law enforcement.  Racial profiling also 
exacerbates tensions between racial minorities and law enforcement, 
                                                                                                                 
having endured the conditions of prison). 
 91. See id. (stating that families lose the social and economic support of the 
imprisoned family member). 
 92. See id. (“The organization and stability of families may be undermined.”). 
 93. See id. (discussing the social harms of incarceration). 
 94. See Harris, New Approaches, supra note 29, at 83 (noting that “[w]hen one 
segment of society is seen as unfairly targeted or persecuted by the system, the system itself 
loses legitimacy—not just in the eyes of those on the receiving end of the abusive treatment, 
but also in the eyes of all citizens”). 
 95. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Foreword:  Loyalty and Criminal Justice, 49 HOW. L.J. 
405, 413-14 (2006) (noting that in large cities, African-Americans represent a “hugely 
disproportionate” number of victims). 
 96. See id (stating that the hugely disproportionate number of African-American crime 
victims has negatively impacted many African-American communities). 
 97. Capers, supra note 30, at 842. 
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and undermines the rationale for community policing.  Thus, efforts to 
engage these citizens in crime prevention partnerships with law 
enforcement face challenges that may not be present in other 
communities.  David Harris also notes that racial profiling can have a 
negative impact on the way in which minority groups view law 
enforcement.  Harris writes, “Racially targeted traffic stops cause deep 
cynicism among blacks about the fairness and legitimacy of law 
enforcement and courts . . . .  Thus it is no wonder that Blacks view the 
criminal justice system in totally different terms than whites do.”98  For 
example, San Diego Police Chief Jerome Sanders and the San Diego 
Police Department voiced concerned that the “growing public 
perception that police target minority drivers [] was ‘eroding public 
trust and need[ed] to be addressed if community policing . . . [was] [] 
to be successful.’”99 
Not only is racial profiling harmful to individuals and 
communities, but, as previously discussed, there is evidence 
demonstrating that racial profiling is an ineffective law-enforcement 
tool.  Despite the disproportionate number of stops and searches of 
African-Americans and Latinos, studies show that when searched, 
these groups were less likely than Whites to have contraband.100  
Together, these facts confirm not only the existence of racial profiling, 
but that racial profiling is an ineffective tool for law enforcement 
whose costs outweigh any negligible benefit.  Given these societal 
costs, innovative solutions are required to address racial profiling. 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law, supra note 7, at 298. 
 99. David A. Harris, Addressing Racial Profiling in the States:  A Case Study of the 
“New Federalism” in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 367, 389 n. 
157 (2001).  Thus, to prevent the tensions associated with the perception from racial 
profiling from undermining the gains he had made in community policing, Sanders decided 
that the San Diego Police Department would “become the first major city police department 
to begin collecting traffic stop data on its own initiative, without any federal or state 
mandate.”  Id. at 389. 
 100. See Capers, supra note 30, at 850 (providing statistics showing that although 
Blacks and Hispanics were stopped more, Whites were found with evidence of criminal 
activity more often); see also Darmer, supra note 50, at 119 (discussing the unique problems 
involved in teaching racial profiling issues in racially homogeneous classrooms).  Darmer 
stated: 
Although stopped Blacks [in California] were 127% more likely to be frisked 
than stopped Whites, they were 42.3% less likely to be found with a weapon 
after they were frisked, 25% less likely to be found with drugs and 33% less 
likely to be found with other contraband. We found similar patterns for Latinos. 
Id. 
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III.  Remedies to Eradicate Racial Profiling 
A.  Federal and State Legislation Specifically Addressing Racial Profiling 
There are several possible measures that policymakers could 
implement to address racial profiling at both the national and local levels.  
The almost insurmountable legal standards and the difficulty in sustaining 
Equal Protection claims, suggests that reliance on judicial remedies is ill-
advised.   Alternatively, legislative efforts, may offer a more promising 
strategy to address racial profiling.  For many years, Representative John 
Conyers and others in Congress have been working to pass federal 
legislation that would address racial profiling.  Conyers first proposed the 
Traffic Stops Statistics Act in 1997, but efforts to pass this legislation 
failed.101  Then in 2001, Conyers introduced a more comprehensive End 
Racial Profiling Act of 2001.102  Despite wide bi-partisan support, this Act 
also failed to pass but was reintroduced in 2004, 2005, 2007, 2009, and 
2010.  The End Racial Profiling Act of 2011 was introduced again in 2011 
and proponents are anxiously awaiting the bill’s fate.  The End Racial 
Profiling Act would prohibit and attempt to eliminate racial profiling by 
federal, state, local, and tribal law-enforcement agencies and would allow 
the federal government or private plaintiffs to sue for declaratory or 
injunctive relief.103  Furthermore, if enacted, the law would authorize the 
United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to provide grants for “the 
development and implementation of best policing practices, such as, early 
                                                                                                                 
 101. See Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1997, H.R. 118, 105th Cong. (1997) (requiring 
data to be collected during all traffic stops for trend analysis); see also Traffic Stops 
Statistics Act of 1999, H.R. 1443, 106th Cong. (1999) (requiring officers to collect data 
during all traffic stops for subsequent trend analysis). 
 102. See End Racial Profiling Act of 2001, H.R. 2074, 107th Cong. (2001) (expanding 
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 103. See End Racial Profiling Act of 2010, H.R. 5748, 112th Cong. (2010) (refining a 
definition of racial profiling).  The proposed legislation states: 
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Id. 
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warning tracking systems, technology integration, and other management 
protocols that discourage profiling.”104 
Many groups, including the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People and the American Civil Liberties Union, have lobbied 
Congress to pass the federal legislation that specifically prohibits racial 
profiling.105  Despite these efforts, Congress has repeatedly failed to pass 
the End Racial Profiling Act.  Perhaps one positive externality of these 
repeated, yet unsuccessful efforts to pass federal legislation is that many 
states have passed their own legislation aimed at addressing racial 
profiling.106  More than half of the nation’s states have enacted legislation 
either prohibiting racial profiling and/or requiring jurisdictions within the 
state to collect data on law enforcement stops and searches.107  Even many 
states that do not statutorily prohibit racial profiling have made voluntary 
efforts to collect information related to race and traffic.108 
B.  Using DOJ’s Pattern or Practice Authority to Remedy Racial Profiling 
Much of the contemporary debate related to racial profiling focuses 
upon whether definitive proof exists regarding an officer’s intentional 
discrimination or whether an agency has a policy or custom of racial 
profiling.109  It is unlikely that an officer will admit his or her bias or that an 
agency will produce their racially-biased policy, thus making definitive 
proof of profiling difficult to ascertain.  A more effective strategy to 
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address racial profiling involves ameliorating systemic policies and 
practices that encourage or tolerate racial profiling and to assist the police 
department in implementing practices that will rehabilitate minority’s 
confidence in the police department.  It is now widely accepted among 
scholars that much police misconduct is attributable to an organizational 
culture within law enforcement agencies that “cultivates or tolerates” police 
misbehavior.110  Experts have agreed that adjudicatory remedies that are 
focused on the past misconduct of individual officers are largely 
ineffective, and that the best way to address police misconduct is to 
implement proactive practices that encourage broader institutional 
changes.111  For example, the Christopher Commission, which examined the 
Los Angeles Police Department after the infamous police beating of 
Rodney King, found that a small number of officers within a police 
department were responsible for the majority of complaints.112  Therefore, 
many experts theorize that identifying, monitoring, re-training, or 
disciplining “problem” officers is likely to lead to the greatest reduction in 
misconduct.113  Civil rights suits against officers and municipalities, internal 
investigations, and citizen-complaint review boards are all tools to address 
police misconduct.  These tools, however, are reactionary and are only 
utilized to remedy previous, discrete instances of misconduct.  It is clear 
that these adjudicatory measures are inadequate to change the culture of a 
police department that engages in racial profiling or other systemic issues 
of misconduct. 
An institutional culture that encourages or tolerates racial profiling 
necessitates an institutional remedy.  One of the most promising models to 
remedy systemic police misconduct is the DOJ’s “pattern or practice” 
authority, which the federal government has used to implement systemic 
reforms within several local police departments nationwide.  In 1994, 
Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 14141, a statute that seeks to address the 
policies and practices of a police agency, and has shown great promise in 
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spurring institutional reforms in several local law-enforcement agencies.114  
Pursuant to its “pattern or practice” authority under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the 
DOJ has required several police departments nationwide, including the Los 
Angeles Police Department and the District of Columbia Metropolitan 
Police Department, to reform their policies and practices.115  Section 14141 
grants the U.S. government the authority to sue for injunctive relief to 
change policies within a local police department where DOJ has found a 
pattern or practice of constitutional violations.116  Generally, the resulting 
consent decrees or agreements have included reforms of both substantive 
and procedural policies to create more transparency and ensure 
accountability.117  One reform includes modifying use of force policies to 
provide guidelines regarding what type of force is appropriate in 
apprehending a suspect and defining or limiting circumstances when certain 
uses of force are appropriate.118  Another common reform DOJ has required 
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is the implementation of an early-warning tracking system to help 
supervisors identify officers who might need to be re-trained or 
disciplined.119  Collecting this type of information and using it to make 
training and personnel decisions may deter the intentional wrongdoing of 
individual officers.  Yet another reform is the implementation of fair and 
comprehensive complaint processes for citizens who wish to report alleged 
misconduct.120  Many citizens, especially minorities, are reluctant to file 
complaints against police officers because they simply believe that their 
complaints will not be fairly processed.  To ensure fairness and reduce the 
possibility for retaliation, officers assigned to investigate citizen complaints 
should be sufficiently independent from the officers they are investigating.  
Notably, DOJ has also required several jurisdictions to compile information 
related to racial profiling.121  Compiling and publishing information related 
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to race and traffic stops and searches may help jurisdictions determine 
whether officers are disproportionately stopping racial minorities.  With 
vigorous enforcement, DOJ’s pattern or practice authority could lead to 
reforms that will ultimately address many of the systemic issues 
contributing to tension between minorities and the police. 
Several of the agreements and consent decrees that DOJ has entered 
with local departments have explicitly contained provisions to alleviate 
racial profiling.122  DOJ required in its agreements with police departments 
in Prince George’s County, Maryland, Mt. Prospect, Illinois, and the State 
of New Jersey that these entities implement measures to eradicate racial 
profiling.  For example, in its agreement with the Mt. Prospect Police 
Department, the police department was required to develop and implement 
the following:  a written policy against discrimination in policing, including 
nondiscrimination in conducting traffic stops; documentation of all traffic 
stops by recording the driver’s race, ethnic origin, and gender; the reason 
for the stop and the nature of any post-stop actions; improved supervisory 
review of traffic stops and other police enforcement practices; a community 
outreach and information program, under which officers will give their 
names and the reason for a traffic stop at the outset of the stop and provide 
complaint forms in English or Spanish to persons who object to an officer’s 
conduct; increased training regarding nondiscrimination, interpersonal 
communications, cultural diversity, and ethics; and provide semi-annual 
public reports providing traffic stop statistics by race and summary 
information on complaint investigations.123 
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DOJ’s pattern or practice authority becomes increasingly relevant in 
the struggle to combat racial profiling for several reasons.  First, while 
some states have passed revolutionary legislation to address racial profiling, 
the legislative requirements regarding data and other measures to combat 
profiling vary widely.124  Without comprehensive federal legislation that 
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specifically addresses racial profiling, implementing broader reforms that 
indirectly address profiling may present a reasonable alternative.  Second, 
even where states have enacted legislation to address racial profiling, these 
laws are not immune to repeal by newly elected state legislatures.  For 
example, in Wisconsin, Governor Tommy Thompson created the 
Governor’s Task Force on Racial Profiling to study racial profiling.125  The 
Task Force found that there was anecdotal evidence of racial profiling 
within Wisconsin law enforcement agencies and recommended training, 
community participation, and the collection of data on traffic stops.126  
After the Task Force issued the report, then-governor Scott McCallum 
issued an executive order requiring “all enforcement agencies in the State 
of Wisconsin to enact a policy prohibiting the practice of racial 
profiling.”127  Finding that many agencies were not following the 
recommendations or complying with the executive order, the Wisconsin 
state legislature passed a racial profiling bill that required all Wisconsin 
law-enforcement officers to begin collecting and submitting data from 
traffic stops to determine “whether the number of traffic stops between 
minorities and non-minorities 1) is disproportionate and 2) whether the 
number of traffic stop searches between minorities and non-minorities is 
disproportionate.”128  However, amid fierce opposition from law-
enforcement agencies, the Wisconsin legislature quickly repealed the bill in 
June 2011.129  The repeal of this state law strengthens the arguments that 
federal protections are necessary to ensure sustained efforts to eradicate 
racial profiling. 
One recent example of how DOJ’s enforcement of its pattern or 
practice authority can address racial profiling is quickly unfolding in 
several communities near Los Angeles.  Pursuant to its pattern or practice 
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authority, DOJ recently opened an investigation into the Los Angeles 
County Sherriff’s Department amid violations of racial profiling in the 
communities of Lancaster and Palmdale.130  These communities have 
experienced a dramatic increase in the number of African-Americans and 
Latinos in recent years, many of whom live in the communities’ public 
housing.131  Residents allege that city officials and police have engaged in 
widespread harassment of many minorities in order to encourage them to 
move from the community.132  DOJ had previously investigated whether 
officials were violating the Fair Housing Act, and Assistant Attorney 
General Tomas Perez recently announced that the investigation would 
expand to include the Los Angeles County Sherriff’s Department, which 
contracts with Palmdale and Lancaster to provide police protection.133  In 
his announcement, Assistant Attorney General Perez stated that 
“[DOJ officials] are analyzing arrest data in the Palmdale and Lancaster 
[police] stations.  These stations appear to have disproportionately high 
rates of misdemeanor and obstruction arrests compared to the rest of Los 
Angeles County.  While the rates of felony arrests are similar to 
elsewhere in the county, the two cities appear to have unusually high 
rates of misdemeanor arrests, and particularly high rates of arrests of 
African Americans.”134 
Depending on the outcome of DOJ’s investigation, these communities 
may be required to implement reforms to not only collect data on their 
traffic stops, searches, and arrests, may be mandated to implement training 
and other measures to alleviate profiling. 
While efforts to collect data on racial profiling should continue, the 
focus must shift beyond proving racial profiling to changing the perceptions 
and mending the rift between police and communities of color.  The 
difficulty in capturing the true extent of racial profiling makes it extremely 
challenging to propose suitable remedies, but implementing widespread 
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internal organizational reforms advocated by police practices experts 
represents a promising strategy to combat this unconstitutional and 
ineffective practice. 
